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Abstract 
We study the role of contract enforcement in shaping the dynamics of international trade at the firm 
level. We develop  a theoretical model to describe how agents build reputations to overcome the 
problems  created  by  weak  enforcement  of  international  contracts.  We  find  that,  all  else  equal, 
exporters start their activities with higher volumes and remain as exporters for a longer period in 
countries with better contracting institutions. However, conditional on survival, the growth rate of a 
firm’s exports to a country decreases with the quality of the country’s institutions. We test these 
predictions using a rich panel of Belgium exporting firms from 1995 to 2008 to every country in the 
world. We adopt two alternative empirical strategies. In one specification we use firm-year fixed 
effects to  control  for time-varying  firm-specific  characteristics.  Alternatively,  we  model  selection 
more  explicitly  with  a  two-step  Heckman  procedure  using  “extended  gravity”  variables  as  our 
exclusion restrictions. Results from both specifications support our predictions. Overall, our findings 
suggest that weak contracting institutions cannot be thought simply as an extra sunk or fixed cost to 
exporting firms; they also significantly affect firms’ trade volumes and have manifold implications for 
firms’ dynamic patterns in foreign markets. 
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Imperfect enforcement of contracts can prevent mutually beneﬁcial transactions from taking place.
This problem tends to be particularly severe for transactions that involve agents in diﬀerent juris-
dictions, as in international trade. Empirical research using aggregate data has found that weak
contract enforcement indeed depresses aggregate trade levels signiﬁcantly.1 Y e tw ek n o wv i r t u a l l y
nothing about how contracting institutions shape the dynamics of trade at the ﬁrm level; this is our
focus in this paper. We show that weak institutions aﬀect trade volumes also at the level of ﬁrms.
More importantly, they decrease ﬁrm survival rates while at the same time increasing growth of
the exporting ﬁrms that manage to cope. Hence, it is not that bad contracting institutions simply
imply a higher sunk, ﬁxed or even variable cost of exporting; they also have manifold implications
for the dynamic pattern of exporting ﬁrms.
We show this with a simple two-country dynamic model where producers in one country export
their goods to another country by engaging in partnerships with local distributors. Potential
exporters search for prospective partners under incomplete information, being unable to observe
the type of their distributors. This makes exporters initially cautious, as some of the distributors
are opportunistic and default on their contracts if they can do so without incurring extra costs.
But others are forward-looking and have an incentive to abide by their contractual obligations. By
doing so they build private reputations within their relationships, and through this mechanism they
can, over time, (imperfectly) compensate for the problem created by asymmetric information and
inadequate enforcement of contracts. An implication is that producers in successful partnerships
increase their exports to a country over time. This helps to explain the signiﬁcant variation in export
volumes across ﬁrms observed in micro data sets.2 Another implication is that the conditional
probability of a partnership failure decreases with its duration.3
Our main interest is, however, in comparing how ﬁrms’ export behavior depends on the strength
of the contracting institutions of their destinations. The model generates several interesting testable
implications based on this distinction. First, producers selling to countries with good contracting
1Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and Ranjan and Lee (2007), for example, ﬁnd sizeable eﬀects of institutional
variables on bilateral trade ﬂows using gravity speciﬁcations. Turrini and van Ypersele (2010) show that diﬀerences
in legal systems depress trade also within a country (France), although the eﬀect is larger across countries.
2See for example Eaton et al. (2008). There are alternative, complementary explanations for this stylized fact.
For example, Rauch and Watson (2003) model buyers who need to make irreversible investments to train foreign
suppliers in an environment with asymmetric information. Arkolakis (2010) studies the implications of increasing
marginal penetration costs. Albornoz et al. (2010) and Eaton et al. (2010) analyze the consequences of uncertain
export proﬁtability and of foreign demand, respectively.
3This is diﬀerent but related to Besedes and Prusa’s (2006) ﬁnding that the hazard of trade relationships between
the United States and other countries at the product level decreases with their duration.
1institutions start their activities there with higher volumes. Second, they tend to serve those
markets for a longer period. These results stem from two reinforcing eﬀects. There is a direct
eﬀect from better institutions: they make contractual defaults more diﬃcult, which both increases
the expected longevity of partnerships and makes producers more conﬁdent about the workings
of their partnerships; this in turn induces them to start with higher volumes. There is also a
“cleansing” eﬀect from good institutions. Since opportunistic agents are more constrained in those
environments, their relationships last longer. As a result, in steady state relatively few low-type
distributors are available for matches with new exporters, who in turn start their foreign sales with
a better prior about their distributors. This too leads to higher initial export volumes and greater
average export spells.
Third, conditional upon survival, the growth of a ﬁrm’s exports to a country decreases with
the quality of the country’s institutions. The reason is that, in a good institutional environment,
the private reputation of a distributor evolves slowly over time, as successful interactions are less
informative of the distributor’s type when institutions impose tighter constraints on agents’ be-
havior. A corollary is that, for ﬁrms with export experience in a market, the relationship between
export levels to that market and the country’s institutional strength is generally ambiguous. On
one hand, tighter enforcement of contracts raises the expected return of foreign exporters, boost-
ing trade volumes. On the other hand, it has the perverse eﬀect of slowing down the learning of
exporters. The net eﬀect on the level of trade for experienced exporters may therefore be either
positive or negative.
We test these predictions using a rich panel of Belgian ﬁrms that contains both goods exports
values and their destinations from 1995 to 2008. Our data allows us to control for a wide range
of factors at the ﬁrm, destination and time dimensions. We employ two alternative empirical
speciﬁcations. In one we use ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects to control for time-varying ﬁrm-speciﬁcc h a r a c -
teristics that aﬀect ﬁrm decisions about where to export, for how long and how much. Therefore,
we identify the eﬀects of institutions on ﬁrms’ export dynamics only from within-ﬁrm-year variation
in export destinations, so for example unobservable time-varying shocks to ﬁrm productivity are
fully accounted for. In our second speciﬁcation, we model market selection more explicitly with a
two-step Heckman procedure where in the ﬁrst stage we model ﬁrm entry and survival in foreign
markets and in the second stage we estimate the choice of export volumes and export growth. Our
exclusion restrictions are based on “extended gravity” variables proposed by Morales et al. (2011).
As Morales et al. (2011) show, characteristics of a ﬁrm’s previous export destinations are good
predictors of the ﬁrm’s entry sunk costs in other destinations, but generally do not aﬀect the ﬁrm’s
2operational proﬁt in new destinations.
We ﬁnd support for our theoretical predictions from both estimation methods. Overall, our
ﬁndings reveal that weak contracting institutions cannot be thought simply as an extra sunk or
a ﬁxed export cost, as is usually believed; they also aﬀect ﬁrms’ export levels and their dynamic
patterns in foreign markets in a non-trivial way. Essentially, if institutions are unable to neutralize
the problems created by informational frictions, ﬁrms can overcome those problems over time by
building private reputations within their relationships. Such a mechanism operates more strongly,
the weaker the country’s contracting institutions.4
Naturally, reliance on private reputations is not the only way to deal with informational prob-
lems in countries where institutions impose lax restrictions on agents’ behavior. In such an envi-
ronment, an exporting ﬁrm may want, for example, to acquire a domestic importer if controlling
the partner’s actions is facilitated when the partner is an aﬃliate. Or the ﬁrm may decide to export
through a wholesaler that has experience in assessing “diﬃcult” markets. Similarly, the diﬃculties
ﬁrms face when exporting to institutionally weak countries are not the same for all ﬁrms. Surely
some are more apt to penetrate those markets than others, either because of the type of goods they
produce or because of diﬀerent characteristics. We shed light on those diﬀerences by examining em-
pirically whether a ﬁrm’s export dynamics are less aﬀected by the importing country’s institutional
environment when the ﬁrm has a subsidiary in the importing country (the answer we ﬁnd is “no”),
when it exports through a wholesaler (“maybe”), when it exports simpler products (“probably”),
a n dw h e nt h eﬁrm is more experienced (“yes”).
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst formal theoretical and empirical analysis of the dynamic
process in which ﬁrms engaged in international exchange build reputations as a response to the
imperfect enforceability of contracts. This permits us to take a ﬁrst look at how institutions shape
ﬁrms’ dynamics in foreign markets. The paper that is closest to ours is the recent study by Besedes
et al. (2011), who examine how credit constraints in the origin country aﬀect import growth at
the product level in the European Union and the U.S.5 Exploring a mechanism that is intuitively
similar to ours, they ﬁnd that imports of more ﬁnancially dependent goods from less developed
countries are initially constrained but grow relatively fast.
The bulk of the recent but growing literature on institutions and international trade has focused
4This is also in line with evidence from studies that focus on the development of trust. For example, McMillan
and Woodruﬀ (1999), analyzing Vietnam, show forcefully how relationships based on trust arise and develop in an
environment where contract enforcement is virtually absent.
5See also Aeberhardt et al. (2011), who study related but diﬀerent empirical implications obtained from a variant
of our model.
3instead on developing and testing the implications from static frameworks. Signiﬁcant attention
has been given to the fundamental question of how diﬀerent types of institutions shape the pattern
of comparative advantage across countries (Acemoglu et al. 2007; Antràs 2005; Costinot 2009;
Cuñat and Melitz 2011; Levchenko 2007; Nunn 2007). Much work has also been done to under-
stand how contractual frictions aﬀect the structure of trade through their eﬀects on the boundaries
of the ﬁrm.6 From a diﬀerent perspective, McLaren (1999) characterizes the circumstances un-
der which ﬁrms choose to base their relationships on trust instead of on (enforceable) contracts.
More recently, Antràs and Foley (2011) analyze how the choice of ﬁnancial terms in international
transactions depends on the quality of the institutions in the importing and exporting countries.
In the same spirit of our analysis, they also study how this eﬀect changes over time, as agents
develop their relationships. Our paper is also related to a new burgeoning literature on the role
of intermediation in international trade, which documents the importance of intermediaries and
develops an understanding of the circumstances when international trade is likely to be carried out
indirectly, through intermediaries.7 Finally, our paper is connected as well to a broader literature
that seeks to explain how informal cooperative coalitions form and develop in the absence of formal
enforcement institutions.8
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we develop the model and characterize the steady
state of the economy. In section 3 we derive testable implications focusing on the various channels
through which institutional quality shapes international trade at the ﬁrm level. We describe the
data in section 4. In section 5 we show our empirical ﬁndings, including evidence for diﬀerential
eﬀects for diﬀerent types of good, ﬁrms and export modes. We conclude in section 6.
2M o d e l
We develop a model where agents learn about the reliability of their trade partners through expe-
rience. The main thrust of the model is that this learning depends on the country’s institutions,
because weaker institutions provide agents with a greater scope to behave opportunistically. This
can be modeled in many diﬀerent ways. We choose to make some strong assumptions that allow
6For example, Bernard et al. (2010a) and Corcos et al. (2009) estimate the eﬀect of product contractibility and
countries’ institutions on the choice and the level of intra-ﬁrm trade. For a recent survey of this topic, see Antras
and Rossi-Hansberg (2009).
7See, among others, Bernard et al. (2010b, 2011), Felbermayr and Jung (2011), Ahn et al. (2011) and Tang and
Zhang (2011). For an earlier inﬂuential contribution in this area, see Feenstra and Hanson (2004).
8See Greif (1993) for an insightful early contribution to that literature. He analyzes how medieval merchants
sustained trade among them and why they accomplished that by developing a system of collective, rather than
private, punishment for dishonest agents.
4us to keep the analysis simple. Most of those assumptions can be relaxed, however; in the end of
this section we discuss alternatives to them.
2.1 Environment
Consider an economy with two countries, Home and Foreign. In Home there is a [01] continuum
of agents with the ability to produce diﬀerentiated goods, and in Foreign there is a [01] continuum
of agents with the ability to internally distribute such goods. Each producer is a monopolist in
his own market and has a constant marginal cost of production, .9 Thus, the sales of a producer
in the domestic market has no impact on his sales abroad. All producers have the same discount
factor,  ∈ (01). In contrast, distributors in Foreign come in two diﬀerent types: a measure b  of
distributors is myopic and has a zero discount factor, while a measure 1 − b  is patient and has a
discount factor  ∈ (01). The type of a distributor is her private information.
The assumption that distributors diﬀer in terms of their discount factors captures the idea that
they condition their behavior on characteristics that are unobservable to the producers. Clearly,
there are alternative interpretations as to what those unobservable characteristics may be. For
instance, at the end of this section we discuss an alternative where distributors may diﬀer in terms
of their ability to distribute goods in Foreign.
In every period, there is a probability  ∈ (01) that a producer in Home meets with a distributor
in Foreign. If a meeting occurs, we say the producer and the distributor have found a “business
opportunity.” They then decide whether to form a partnership in which the producer exports goods
to the distributor, who sells them in Foreign. If they do, at the end of every period in which the
partnership is active they also decide between maintaining and breaking the partnership. We
assume that each producer and distributor can participate in only one partnership at a time. We
discuss the implications from relaxing this assumption at the end of the section.
At the beginning of every period in any ongoing partnership, the producer proposes a one-period
contract to the distributor. We impose restrictions to prevent the separation between myopic and
patient distributors during the contracting stage. If such separation were possible, we would be
unable to study the dynamic interplay between the process of reputation formation and the volume
of trade. We prevent separation by restricting the class of contracts as follows. The contract
speciﬁes the quantity  of goods to be exported and distributed in Foreign, and that the distributor
has to return the ensuing revenue to the producer. The contract also speciﬁes a payment 0 to
9Note that it is straightforward to extend the model to allow for heterogeneous ﬁrms. This would, however,
generate no insight beyond those already well known from Melitz (2003) and the literature that paper spurred.
5the distributor, which we treat as exogenous.10
In reality, learning about the quality of one’s match involves learning not about a single dimen-
sion like an agent’s discount factor but about many dimensions (the agent’s honesty, work ethic,
knowledge, overall reliability etc.). In such a multi-dimensional setting, learning tends to happen
both through experience and through contract screening. We focus on a single dimension and
restrict contracts so that we can shut down the latter channel and highlight the workings of the
former.
In every period after the partnership is formed and the volume of trade is chosen by the producer,
the distributor decides between performing according to the contract (returning the revenue to
the producer) and defaulting (keeping the revenue for herself). We want to emphasize that the
possibility of default is closely linked to the institutional quality of Foreign. We do so by assuming
that in each period while the partnership is active, the distributor privately ﬁnds an opportunity
to default on the contract without incurring costs with probability 1 − . With probability ,t h e
distributor does not ﬁnd such an opportunity. This probability is independent across distributors
and over time. Thus, the parameter  provides a measure of the strength of Foreign’s contract
enforcement institutions.11
We want to study situations where distributors can act opportunistically in their relationships
with exporters. Our assumption that distributors can “steal the revenue” from exporters captures
this idea in a simple way. At the end of this section we discuss alternative ways in which such
opportunistic behavior may arise.
Finally, at the end of each period there is a probability 1− ∈ (01) that an ongoing partnership
will break down for exogenous reasons (e.g. the product becomes “obsolete”). When a partnership
ends, for endogenous or exogenous reasons, the distributor exits the market and is replaced by
another distributor of the same type. Similarly, the producer loses the ability to sell in Foreign’s
market and is replaced by a new producer.12
Figure 1 describes the sequence of events within a period. In what follows, we let  ≡  and
10Restrictions like these are common in the reputations literature. For instance, in Tirole’s (1996) classic model of
collective reputation, there are agents who are ‘honest’ and others who are ‘dishonest.’ Both are behavioral types.
Only agents of the third type (‘opportunistic’) act strategically. The contract oﬀered by the principal in Tirole’s
model precludes screening and is very simple: the principal can only oﬀer one of two tasks.
11We study the consequences of contract enforcement institutions in Foreign, but not in Home, because our data
has multiple import countries (hence there is variation in that dimension) but only one exporting country, where
contracting institutions are relatively strong, Belgium.
12This assumption is adopted only to simplify exposition. In the online Appendix
(http://personal.lse.ac.uk/ornelas/AMO_OnlineAppendix.pdf) we consider the case where producers return
to the pool of unmatched producers after the end of a partnership, showing that the qualitative results are
unchanged.
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Figure 1: Sequence of Events within a Period
 ≡  denote the relevant discount factors of producers and patient distributors, respectively.
2.2 Equilibrium
Consider the following strategy proﬁle. Each producer forms a partnership whenever he meets
a distributor. In a partnership, the producer chooses the quantity to export in each period by
maximizing current expected proﬁts. The producer terminates an existing partnership if and only
if the distributor defaults on the contract. Each myopic distributor defaults whenever he ﬁnds an
opportunity to do so, while patient distributors never default. A distributor never terminates a
partnership. In this subsection we show that this strategy proﬁle is part of a sequential equilibrium
and characterize a steady state in which entry and exit in Foreign’s market are equalized.
2.2.1 Producer’s Behavior
Assume that distributors behave as above. The problem of a producer is as follows. At the
beginning of every period, if he is not in a partnership and ﬁnds a business opportunity, he decides
whether to take the opportunity and form a partnership. If the producer is in a partnership, in
every period he writes a one-period contract with the distributor establishing the volume of output
to sell in Foreign and the compensation to the distributor; at the end of the period he decides
whether to maintain it.
Reputation All decisions of a producer depend on his belief about the type of the distributor he
is paired with. In turn, beliefs depend on past decisions made by the distributor.
7It is immediate to see that, since patient distributors never default, the producer concludes that
the distributor is myopic as soon as he observes a default. The situation is diﬀerent if the producer
has never observed a default. Let  denote the posterior belief that the distributor is myopic in
an ongoing partnership that started at date  and is currently in period  + ,a n dl e t0 ∈ (01)






Note that  decreases with  and converges to zero as  goes to inﬁnity, regardless of 0.T h a t
is, as long as the distributor does not default and the partnership is not terminated exogenously,
the producer becomes increasingly convinced that the distributor is patient. We interpret 1− as
the reputation of the distributor. A reputation of being patient means that the producer’s belief
 that his distributor is myopic is relatively small.
Contract Denote the producer’s current belief that the distributor is myopic by . The producer
pays the cost of production. He receives the revenue if the distributor does not default, an event
with probability +1−. Otherwise, he receives nothing. Thus, the producer’s current expected
proﬁt when the contract establishes production level  is
(;)=− +( +1− )() − ,( 2 )
where () is the revenue from selling  units in Foreign.
The assumptions on the structure of contracts imply that they cannot be used to extract
information about the distributor’s type. Thus, when proposing a contract the producer chooses 
to maximize (;). Denoting the producer’s optimal quantity by ,t h eﬁrst-order necessary
condition if the producer chooses to sell a strictly positive quantity is
− +( +1− )0()=0 .( 3 )
Condition (3)r e q u i r e s0()  0. The second-order necessary condition for  requires 00()  0.
The optimal quantity  = (;) depends on the belief  of the producer, on the institutional
parameter , and on the marginal cost of production .
We impose restrictions on the structure of demand and the range of parameters {} such




1 implies that the quantity that maximizes current variable expected proﬁts is strictly positive
even when the producer is certain that the distributor is myopic ( =1 ) . In that case, however, 2
implies that the producer’s current expected proﬁt is strictly negative. 3 implies, in turn, that
the producer’s current expected proﬁt is strictly positive when he is certain that the distributor is
patient ( =0 ) .
Partnership Consider an ongoing partnership in which the producer has a belief  that the
distributor is myopic such that (;)  0.T h eﬂow payoﬀ of the producer is given by
()=− +( +1− )() − ,( 4 )
while his continuation payoﬀ depends on the posterior beliefs. If the producer observes a default,
he infers that the distributor is myopic. Assumption 2 then implies that he terminates the
partnership. If the producer does not observe a default, his belief that the distributor is patient
increases. Since () is decreasing in , this implies that the producer maintains the partnership.
It remains to consider whether the producer would ever want to start a partnership. This
decision depends on his prior 0 about the average quality of the inactive distributors (i.e., those
who are not in a partnership). Note that an unmatched producer faces a stationary problem. Thus,
he either forms a partnership upon meeting with a distributor for the ﬁr s tt i m eo rh en e v e rf o r m sa
partnership. The following lemma fully characterizes the behavior of producers. This and all other
proofs are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 There is a unique value  ≡ (0) ∈ (01) such that, if 0  ,ap r o d u c e r
forms a partnership whenever he ﬁnds a business opportunity. Moreover, he chooses to maintain
the partnership if and only if the distributor does not default, and exports (;) in every period
while the partnership is active.
In subsection 223 we characterize 0 in terms of primitives and establish conditions under
which 0  .
92.2.2 Distributor’s Behavior
We now solve the problem of the distributor, taking as given the behavior of the producers. First
note that since producers pay the cost of production, the gain of a distributor in a partnership is
always positive.
Consider a myopic distributor. By deﬁnition, she does not care about the future and therefore
does not bother to build a reputation. Hence, a myopic distributor has an incentive to default
and keep the revenue whenever she ﬁnds an opportunity to do so. A patient distributor, on the
other hand, anticipates that after a default her partnership will be terminated, given the strategy
of the producers. Conversely, if there is no default her reputation with the producer improves and
the relationship is maintained with probability . Hence, as long as she is not too impatient and
the probability of an exogenous breakdown of the partnership is not too large, she never defaults.
Lemma 2 formalizes this claim.







such that a patient distributor
never defaults if and only if  ≥ .
If   , there would exist at least one  ∈ N such that the distributor defaults on the
contract if given the opportunity to do so in the  period of a partnership. Assumption 2 then
implies that the producer would terminate the partnership at the end of the ( − 1)
 period, as he
would anticipate the behavior of the distributor. In turn, this implies that the distributor would not
have any incentive to honor her contract in the ( − 1)
 period. Proceeding this way it is easy to
see that the only equilibrium would involve default whenever possible in any ongoing partnership,
implying negative expected proﬁts from entry for the producer. Concentrating on the interesting
case where producers are willing to export, we assume henceforth that  ≥ .
We focus on the polar case where distributors with low discount factor always default and
distributors with high discount factor never default, but this could be relaxed. More generally,
one could think of an environment where distributors come in many types. For instance, discount
factors could be independent random realizations of a uniform distribution in the unit interval. We
conjecture that, as in our present structure, this modiﬁed environment would also exhibit a positive
relationship between the discount factor of the distributor and the period she starts defaulting on
the contract (which would be never for those distributors with very high discount factors, as here).
This implies that a producer would end a partnership as soon as a default is observed, and that
a producer who does not observe a default would increase his posterior that the distributor is
relatively patient. It also implies that, as we will show to be the case here, the quantity produced
10would increase with the duration of the partnership. The upshot is that the beneﬁt of “cheating”
increases over time, explaining why distributors with relatively high discount factors would default
later in the relationship.
2.2.3 Steady State
We consider a steady state in which entry and exit in Foreign’s market are equalized, and where
the frequency of inactive myopic distributors and the aggregate volume of trade are both constant.
The steady state is however characterized by continual changes in both the extensive and the
intensive margins: some producers enter in Foreign while others exit, whereas continuing exporters
adjust their sales according to the evolution of their beliefs; aggregate trade is constant because
the distribution of partnerships in terms of age does not change.
To characterize the steady state, let  and  be, respectively, the measures of myopic and of
patient distributors that are inactive at date . For now, assume that an exporter always wants to
enter a partnership. Lemmas 1 and 2 then imply that
+1 =( 1− ) +( 1− )(b  − ),( 5 )
+1 =( 1− ) +( 1− )(1 −b  − ).( 6 )
If a myopic distributor is inactive at date , she remains inactive at the beginning of date  +1
unless she ﬁnds a business opportunity at date  (an event with probability ), there is no exogenous
breakdown (an event with probability ), and she does not default (an event with probability ).
If at least one of those events does not realize, the distributor remains without a partner at the
beginning of period +1. If instead the myopic distributor is in a partnership at date ,s h eb e c o m e s
inactive at the beginning of date  +1unless there is no exogenous breakdown and no default. A
similar reasoning applies to the patient distributor, with the diﬀerence that she never defaults.
In the Appendix, we show in Lemma 3 that +1 and +1 strictly decrease over time and
converge, respectively, to
 =
(1 − )b 




(1 − )(1 −b )
1 − (1 − )
.( 8 )
Thus, the frequency of inactive myopic distributors in steady state, 0 = 
+,i sg i v e nb y
0 =
(1 − )[1− (1 − )]b 
(1 − )[1− (1 − )]b  +( 1− )[1− (1 − )](1 −b )
.
11It is easy to check that 0  b . Observe that this steady state is reached only if producers are
always willing to enter Foreign’s market upon ﬁnding a business opportunity. To focus on this
case, henceforth we assume that 0  .13 Notice that in this case there is no zero-proﬁt condition
characterizing the steady state. Instead, the equilibrium is such that entry is limited by search
costs (i.e. the availability of business opportunities).
Proposition 1 follows directly from Lemma 1,L e m m a2 and the assumption that 0  .
Proposition 1 A producer starts a partnership whenever he ﬁnds a business opportunity, main-
tains the partnership as long as he does not observe a default, and exports (;) in each period
 in which the partnership is active, where  is his period- belief that the distributor is myopic. A
myopic distributor defaults whenever there is an opportunity to do so. A patient distributor never
defaults. Irrespective of type, a distributor never terminates a partnership. This strategy proﬁle,
together with the Bayesian updating described in equation (1), is a sequential equilibrium.
Notice that, although producers are ex ante identical in our model, they are ex post hetero-
geneous: at any point in time, some producers export while others do not, and those that do sell
diﬀerent quantities abroad depending on the age of their partnership. That is, ours is a model where
ﬁrm heterogeneity arises endogenously, as a result of distinct individual experiences in a foreign
market. This contrasts with the standard modeling strategy in the literature, after Melitz (2003),
of assuming that ﬁrms diﬀer in terms of their productivity. We abstract from that important, but
well known, source of heterogeneity to study an additional force that causes ﬁrms to behave diﬀer-
ently in foreign markets, namely individual experiences in an environment marked with incomplete
information and imperfect enforcement of contracts. Naturally, in our empirical implementation
we control for diﬀerences in ﬁrm productivity.
Finally, a comment is in order before we proceed. Up to this point we have considered a partic-
ular strategy proﬁle and we have shown that this strategy proﬁle is part of a sequential equilibrium.
However, there are other equilibria. For example, there is always a “no-trade” equilibrium where
the distributor defaults irrespective of her type and the producer, anticipating that the distributor
will always default, does not enter in any partnership. Equilibria like this are clearly unappealing,
both analytically and in the sense that the surplust h e ye n t a i li sa l w a y si n f e r i o rt ot h eo n ei m p l i e d
by the strategy proﬁle in Proposition 1.
13Note that 
∗,w h e r e(
∗) ≡ 0,i sal o w e rb o u n df o r. Intuitively, since in equilbrium the producer’s proﬁt
within a partnership increases over time, the producer must be willing to enter any partnership that oﬀers non-
negative current proﬁts. Note also that 
∗ depends on ,  and ,w h i l e0 depends on , ,  and  .T h u s ,t h e r ei s
always a range of parameters such that 0  . This is the case, for example, if   is small enough.
122.2.4 Discussion and Potential Extensions
Our model is evidently simple, but we believe it contains the central ingredients for the forces
we want to highlight. It can also be extended in numerous ways. We suggest here alternative
interpretations of two key assumptions of the model–that distributors’ types are deﬁned by their
discount factors and that distributors pay producers only after receiving the goods. We also discuss
the implications of relaxing the assumption that a producer and a distributor can only participate
in one partnership at a time, and the assumptions that lead to a slow process of reputation building
but a quick process of reputation loss.14
Distributors’ Types We deﬁne the type of a distributor by her discount factor, but this is not
essential for our results. As long as distributors have unobservable characteristics that separate
them into two groups, a group that defaults whenever possible and a group that never defaults,
Proposition 1 holds.
Consider an environment that is exactly as before except that all distributors have the same
discount factor 0 but vary in terms of their abilities to distribute goods, an attribute that is
unobservable to producers. Speciﬁcally, let a fraction 1 − b  of distributors be able to distribute
goods at zero cost, whereas a fraction b  of distributors needs to incur a cost 0 to distribute
goods. In every partnership, events unfold as follows. First, a distributor observes if she has an
opportunity to default on the contract. After that, she chooses whether to distribute the goods. If
she does, she also decides whether to return the revenue to the producer. If she does not distribute
the goods, she keeps them and obtains a payoﬀ of (),w h e r e ≤ 1.
It is immediate to see that, as long as the discount factor is not too small, an “able” distributor
will choose to always distribute the goods and return the revenue to the producer. The reasoning
is the same as in the original model. Consider now the problem of an “unable” distributor. If there
is no opportunity to default on the contract, she must distribute the goods, incurring cost  and
returning () to the producer. If there is an opportunity to default, a large enough cost  will
make it optimal for the distributor to simply consume the goods, even if this causes the end of the
partnership. If the cost  is not so large as to prevent unable distributors from participating in
partnerships, Proposition 1 holds essentially unchanged. The diﬀerence between these minimum
and maximum levels of eﬀort is necessarily positive as long as  is not too high, so that an unable
distributor would have a large enough probability to default on the contract and keep the goods
without incurring extra costs.
14In an early background working paper of the model (Araujo and Ornelas 2007) we provide other formal extensions.
13Payments We assume that distributors pay exporters only after receiving the goods. This is a
straightforward way to allow for opportunistic behavior in the importing country (where in our
dataset there is variation in terms of institutional quality), but is not essential for our results.15
First, provided that distributors cannot pay in advance more than a myopic distributor expects to
receive in a period–as this would permit the producer to easily screen types–the analysis would
remain identical. But more generally, what is crucial is that distributors have the option to behave
opportunistically in their relationships with exporters, and that this option is more available in
countries with weaker contracting institutions. To make this point clear, we consider below two
alternative scenarios in which the incentives of distributors to behave opportunistically vary with
the institutional setting but are independent of the trade ﬁnance mode.
First consider a scenario where distributors have to sell the goods from Home but also to provide
a service related to the goods (e.g. tailoring the goods to the clients’ needs, or providing technical
assistance). Such services can be oﬀered at either high quality or low quality, the former being
more costly for the distributor. When low-quality service is provided, future demand for the good
drops, and the producer observes this fall in demand in the beginning of the subsequent period.
Suppose that the extra cost of providing high-quality instead of low-quality service is small enough
that it is optimal for the exporter to contractually specify high-quality service from the distributor.
If the distributor is myopic, however, she will choose to provide a low-quality service whenever
she believes she can do so without incurring in legal costs, an event that is more likely, the lower
the country’s institutional quality. It is easy to see that Proposition 1 would remain essentially
unaltered under this setting.
Consider now an alternative scenario that relies on the idea that contracts with many contingen-
cies are more diﬃcult to enforce in countries with lower institutional quality. Speciﬁcally, assume
that a complete contract has  dimensions (contingencies) but only the enforceable contingencies
are written in a contract. Assume further that the number  of enforceable contingencies is in-
creasing in .N o w ,l e t be a random variable that is uniformly distributed in [0],a n dl e t() be
an indicator function such that ()=0if  ∈ [0 ()) and ()=1if  ∈ [()].W ec a nt h e n
describe the probability that a myopic distributor defaults with the probability that  ∈ [()],
which is given by
−()
 . Clearly, this probability is decreasing in Foreign’s institutional quality.
15It is worth noting that, although such “open account” transactions are obviously not the only form of trade
ﬁnancing, they seem to be quite common in practice. We do not know for sure because, as Foley et al. (2010, p. 4)
point out, “there is a dearth of data on the relative use of diﬀerent arrangements” to ﬁnance international trade. But
as they note, the more comprehensive industry surveys indicate that around 80% of the transactions are settled on
an open account basis.
14Again, it is easy to see that Proposition 1 would remain unaltered under this setting.
Partnerships The assumption that producers and distributors cannot participate in more than
one partnership at a time is not particularly important for our results. First, consider that a
producer participates in more than one partnership. Clearly, due to constant marginal cost of
production, the behavior of the producer does not depend on the number of distributors he is
paired with. Second, consider that a distributor is partner with more than one producer at a
time. A natural assumption is that the actions of the distributor towards a particular producer are
observed only by that producer. In that case, the behavior of the distributor does not depend on
the number of producers he is paired with.
A richer environment emerges if we assume instead that the producer can observe the actions
of his distributor in other partnerships, and that the probability that the distributor ﬁnds an
opportunity to default is independent across partnerships. Consider for example the belief of a
producer that is partner with a distributor that participates in  partnerships. If we let  denote





Thus, the reputation of a distributor after a history of no defaults increases at a faster rate. Hence,
the dynamics of the trade volume of an exporter would depend also on the size of his distributor–
i.e. the number of partnerships in which she participates.
Acquisition and Loss of Reputation In our model reputations are acquired slowly over time,
but are lost permanently in a single period. This asymmetry reﬂects our distinct modeling of “good”
and “bad” outcomes: “bad outcomes” from the perspective of producers are always caused by op-
portunistic behavior of distributors, whereas “good outcomes” can be due either to the distributor’s
intention or to institutional constraints. As a result, the construction of a good reputation takes
time, whereas a bad reputation is acquired in a single period. This feature of the model simpliﬁes
the analysis signiﬁcantly, but is not essential.
Suppose that “bad outcomes” from the perspective of exporters could also be generated by fac-
tors other than the opportunistic behavior of distributors, e.g. negative but imperfectly observed
demand shocks. In that case, a producer could choose to maintain his partnership even after ob-
serving a bad outcome, although his belief that the distributor is forward-looking would deteriorate
after such an event. The properties of the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 would nev-
ertheless remain essentially unchanged under such an alternative speciﬁcation. In particular, the
15optimal behavior of a producer would still involve the existence of a threshold (say 0) such that a
partnership is terminated if and only if the posterior  of the producer is higher than 0.W es h o w
this formally in the online Appendix.
3 Institutional Quality, Trade Volume and Dynamics
We want to study how the institutional environment in Foreign aﬀects Home’s exports. Foreign’s
institutions shape both the level and the dynamics of trade relationships, as well as the structure of
the steady state. Some of those eﬀects are novel and can be evaluated empirically; we concentrate
on them.16
3.1 Initial Exports
The institutional environment matters for the initial level of a producer’s exports for two reasons.
First, there is a direct eﬀect from better institutions due to the increase in the probability that the
producer will receive his revenue. As the exporter anticipates this higher probability, he chooses to
export more. Second, under a higher  the measure of active myopic distributors in steady state is
higher; this lowers 0. This improved prior about the average quality of inactive distributors makes
the new exporter more conﬁdent and therefore more willing to start a partnership with a higher
volume.
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This generates the following prediction:
16In our model, and in the predictions discussed below, we ignore selection issues, largely because selection eﬀects
on exporters are well known. Naturally, in the empirical analysis we seek to control for selection as best as we can.
16Prediction 1 All else equal, producers start their sales to a foreign country with a higher volume,
the better is the institutional environment of the country.
3.2 Survival
Survival is deﬁned as the probability that a partnership will be active after  periods after its
formation. The survival of a partnership also depends on the institutional environment in Foreign
through two distinct channels. First, better institutional quality makes a default, and therefore an
endogenous termination, less likely. Furthermore, it raises the quality of the pool of distributors
available to start new partnerships. Both eﬀects increase the probability that a partnership will
still be active after  periods.
Formally, the probability  of survival after  periods can be expressed as
 =( )











since both the direct eﬀect (the ﬁrst term in the square brackets) and the indirect eﬀe c t( t h es e c o n d
term in the square brackets) are positive. This yields a second theoretical prediction:
Prediction 2 All else equal, a partnership is more likely to survive after  periods, the better is
the institutional environment of the importing country.
An implication of this result is that the age proﬁle of active partnerships in Foreign will be
more skewed towards older ones, the higher  is. That is, in steady state a higher  increases the
measure of older partnerships relative to newer ones.
One can also show that the positive eﬀect of better institutions on survival after  +1periods
conditional on having survived  periods decreases with  (and eventually vanishes) when  is large.
Intuitively, for a long enough interaction, reputational forces overcome any institutional weaknesses,
implying that a better institutional environment will have little eﬀect on marginal survival rates for
those old partnerships. For relatively low , on the other hand, the eﬀect of  on the probability
of survival from period  to period  +1can either increase or decrease with .
3.3 Export Growth
Our model also has clear predictions on how institutions aﬀect the growth of surviving exporters.
Crucially, institutional quality shapes the speed of the process of reputation building. As a result,
17it also shapes export growth.
Let us start by describing how the volume of trade within a partnership evolves under the
equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1.N o t e ﬁrst that, although the type of a distributor is
key to determine the probability that a partnership lasts, the actual volume of trade depends only
on the distributor’s reputation with her producer. Hence we can concentrate on the evolution of
the export volume irrespective of the type of distributor the producer is paired with.
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the distributor’s reputation and the
time span of a partnership. Therefore, we can obtain a clear relationship between the export
volume and the age of a partnership. Consider a partnership formed at some date  that is still





[1 − (1 − )]00()
 0,
where  is the export volume in the ( +1 )  period of the partnership. That is, the optimal
export quantity increases as the belief that the distributor is myopic decreases. But we also know
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Hence, in an ongoing partnership the volume of trade increases over time.
This result captures in a simple way the idea that trust is built over time, through repeated
interactions. While a producer learns about the type of his partner, he exports less than he would
if he were sure that the distributor were patient. Thus, in the ﬁrst stages of a partnership rel-
atively low quantities are exported; if the distributor proves to be reliable, the producer then
progressively improves his foreign sales.17 In the limiting case where this process continues until
the producer becomes fully convinced that his distributor is patient, any lack of proper contract
17Our model delivers this point too strongly, making no concession for sales to come down except when the producer
exits Foreign’s market. It also yields the counterfactual prediction that producers exit the market at their pinnacle
(we thank Costas Arkolakis for pointing this out to us). This is a direct implication of our simplifying assumption
that “bad outcomes” from the perspective of the producers are always caused by distributors’ intentions, unlike
“good outcomes.” Yet as discussed in the end of subsection 2.2.4, we develop in the online Appendix an extension
that relaxes this asymmetry without altering the essential properties of our equilibrium. In that extension, after a
“bad outcome” the producer’s belief about the type of the distributor worsens but does not jump to  =1 ), implying
that the export volume falls but can remain strictly positive in the subsequent period. Thus, export volumes within
an active partnership do not increase monotonically over time and a partnership is endogenously terminated only
after quantities have decreased for some time.
18enforcement becomes eﬀectively inconsequential. Hence, suﬃciently long-lasting partnerships over-
come the problems created by informational frictions.
Now, while interesting for our understanding of ﬁrms’ export dynamics, similar results have
been generated in recent models and conﬁrmed empirically.18 What is novel in our model is that
the speed of the process generating export growth conditional on survival depends on the country’s
institutional environment. To see that, deﬁne  ≡  +1− . This is the likelihood with which
the producer expects to receive the revenue. Since  changes over time according to  in equation
(1),s od o e s,s t a r t i n ga t0 = 0 +1− 0 and reaching  =  +1−  after  periods in an
active partnership. The change in this probability,  − 0 = −( − 0)(1− ), unambiguously
decreases with .
Proposition 2 The increase in the likelihood with which the exporter expects to receive his share
of the revenue from period  to period  +  is smaller, the greater is .
The intuition for Proposition 2 can be conveyed as follows. As the reputation of the distributor
improves, the producer becomes more conﬁdent that the contract will be honored. This improved
reputation is reﬂected in the expression −( − 0). However, this matters only when institutions
fail, an event with probability (1 − ). Thus, a small increase in  directly reduces the value of an
improved reputation by ( − 0). Furthermore, a better institutional environment slows down the
process of reputation building itself, because it makes it more diﬃcult for a producer to discern,
after a successful experience, whether the distributor has complied with the contract because she
wanted to or because of the threat of a legal challenge. Or put diﬀerently, a better institutional
setting in Foreign reduces the informational content of past experiences, thus lowering the future
reputation of an active distributor, relative to what it would have been under a lower .T h e s et w o
eﬀects can be expressed as
 ( − 0)





 (0 − )
 | {z }
indirect eﬀect 0
 0.( 9 )
This has important implications for the export growth of active exporters. Let the demand
function satisfy the following condition:
Condition 1
0()
00() is non-decreasing in .
18See Albornoz et al. (2010), Eaton et al. (2010) and Freund and Pierola (2010) for alternative views of why
surviving exporters on average increase exports over time, especially after their ﬁrst year as exporters.
19Condition 1 requires the marginal revenue to not be much ‘ﬂatter’ at higher levels of  (that
is, the rate at which marginal revenue falls with  should not decrease too much with ). The
condition is quite general, being satisﬁed, for example, when demand is linear or CES. If Condition
1 h o l d s( a n di ti so n l yas u ﬃcient condition), then we have that the export growth of individual
active exporters to an economy is higher, the weaker the institutional quality in that economy.
Prediction 3 All else equal, a producer’s export growth rate to a country after  periods is higher,
the lower the institutional environment of the country.
An implication of Prediction 3 is that, if the partnership survives after one period, a clear-cut
ranking of export volumes across destinations with diﬀerent levels of institutional quality no longer
exists. Because of the slower updating process, a producer’s exports to a low- destination after
a successful experience there may be higher (or not) than the exports of the same producer to a
high- (but otherwise identical) country after a similarly successful experience.
4D a t a
In what follows we use subscript  for ﬁrms,  for countries and  for years, while superscript 
denotes the number of years after a partnership starts.
Micro Trade Data and Variables To test the predictions of our model, we use data on Belgian
goods exports provided by the National Bank of Belgium (nbb) . T h ed a t aa l l o w su st oa n a l y z e
exports at the ﬁrm level disaggregated by country over the period 1995-2008.
The trade data is very rich. Exports of each ﬁrm are recorded in current euros at the 8-digit CN
product level by country of destination. The data are collected by the nbb from Intrastat (intra-EU
trade) and Extrastat (extra-EU trade) declarations. The reliability of the trade declaration data
builds upon ﬁrms’ mandatory VAT returns. Sales and purchases involving a non-resident must be
separately indicated in VAT returns due to the diﬀerent treatment of those operations with respect
to the VAT tax. This information is used by the nbb to identify ﬁrms involved in trade activities.
The data encompasses the universe of declared trade transactions. Extra-EU trade is virtually
exhaustive, with the legal requirement for declaration being either a value above 1,000 or a weight
above 1,000 kg. For intra-EU trade, the declaration threshold has changed over time, with ﬁrms
having a legal obligation to declare exports if their total foreign sales are above 104,105 for the
period 1993-1997, above 250,000 for the period 1998-2005, and above 1 million since 2006.
Firms trading less than 1 million euros represent less than 1% of aggregate exports. Moreover,
20ﬁrms often provide information about their European foreign sales even when they are below the
threshold. Since it is unclear whether these threshold changes generate biases in our estimations,
in our benchmark analysis we use all data available. In section 54 we show that adopting diﬀerent
treatments to deal with the changes in EU declaration thresholds does not change our qualitative
results.
As Belgium is a key port of entry to and exit from the EU, Belgian data has the drawback of
including a large amount of re-exports. Many oﬃcial ‘Belgian’ ﬁr m st h u st r a d ee x c l u s i v e l yw i t h
non-resident partners. We deal with this problem by building on information gathered by the nbb
since 1995 and systematically exclude trade by ﬁrms identiﬁed as non-resident.19
In terms of value, Belgium’s main export products are motor vehicles, diamonds and medica-
ments. Relative to the other EU-15 countries, Belgium’s (HS 2-digit) sector strengths are in carpets,
precious or semi-precious stones, articles of zinc and tin, and fertilizers.20
We use the micro trade data to construct the following variables: () a dummy  taking
value 1 if ﬁrm  enters a new export destination  in year  ∈ [19961998];( ) the log value of
exports of ﬁrm  to country  a tt h et i m eo fe n t r y ,0
;( ) a dummy 
 taking value
1i fﬁrm , which has entered market  in year , still exports to  after  periods; ()t h eg r o w t h
of ﬁrm  exports to country  between years  and +, 
;( ) the number of destinations
served by ﬁrm  at time , _;( ) four “extended gravity” variables described in subsection
53. We focus on the cohorts 1996-1998 so that we can follow new exporters to a destination for a
long enough period (10 years).
We consider that a new partnership is created whenever a ﬁrm enters a new export market in a
given year. We deﬁne ﬁrm  as entering a new export destination  in year  if the ﬁrm has positive
exports to destination  in year  but no exports to  in  − 1. Naturally, a ﬁrm may be a new
exporter to country  in year  while being already an exporter to other destinations in  − 1.21
19Non-resident ﬁrms are the main re-exporters in Belgium. They are identiﬁed by the nbb from VAT declarations.
Firms with a Belgian VAT identiﬁer that have a foreign legal address and ﬁrms oﬀering ﬁscal representation services
to foreign ﬁrms are considered as non-resident ﬁrms. Non-resident ﬁr m sm u s tr e p o r th o wm u c ht h e yt r a d ew i t h
foreign parties (re-exports) in VAT declarations. Trade between non-residents ﬁrms and Belgian residents (domestic
trade) is recovered from VAT-suppliers data. Non-residents ﬁrms are classiﬁed as ‘pure’ if they are not involved in
any trade transaction with Belgian residents, and as ‘mixed’ otherwise. Non-resident ﬁrms account for about 26% of
Belgian exports in 2008.












,w h e r e

 denotes exports of a 2-digit HS product  by  and  denotes
total exports by ,  = -15.
21We exclude from the analysis the ﬁrms we can identify as “re-entrants,” which exit a market in a year and return
in the next. In our case, this refers to ﬁrms that export to a destination in 1996 and 1998 but not in 1997. They
correspond to around 2% of the new triples. Including them in the sample has virtually no eﬀect on the results.
21Table 1 reports the number of new ﬁrm-country-year triples during the period 1996-1998.T h e r e
are in total 157537 such triples, with roughly one third of them in each year. Table 1 also shows
the number of ﬁrms and countries involved in this entry activity. Note that the total number of
ﬁrms involved in entry during 1996-1998 is less than the sum of the entering ﬁr m si ne a c hy e a r ,a s
a ﬁrm can be a new exporter (in a diﬀe r e n tm a r k e t )i nm o r et h a no n ey e a r .T h es a m ei st r u ef o r
the total number of countries experiencing entry of new Belgian ﬁrms.
Table 1: Firm Entry Into a New Export Market
Year New Firm-Country-Year Number of Number of
Triples Firms Countries
1996 55,903 23,500 204
1997 54,641 22,833 204
1998 46,993 19,955 205
Overall 157,537 41,060 211
The growth rate of exports after  y e a r si sd e ﬁned as the diﬀerence between log export value
after  years and log export value at entry: 
 ≡ 
−0
. In constructing 

we consider only exporters surviving  periods after entry, i.e. 
 is computed conditional
on 
 =1 . Table 2 reports the number of surviving triples and some descriptive statistics
of the growth of exports  years after entry in a new destination for  =1 2510.I ts h o w st h a t ,
out of the 157537 new triples created during 1996-1998, only about 40% (63970) are still ongoing
after one year. The number of surviving triples decreases over time and, after 10 years, fewer
than 8% of the initial pool (12073) are still ongoing. Table 2 further indicates that, conditional
upon survival, the growth of exports is on average positive. The mean 1-year growth rate is 30%
(=exp02659 −1) and the 10-year growth reaches 268%; the median 1-year and 10-year growth rates
are 25% and 244%, respectively.
Firm-Level Data and Variables Most ﬁrm-level variables are constructed using balance sheet
data from the Business Registry covering the population of ﬁrms required to ﬁle their (uncon-
solidated) accounts to the nbb. The data combine annual accounts ﬁgures with data from the
Crossroads bank on ﬁrms’ main sector of activity and legal status. The large majority of ﬁrms
registered in Belgium (i.e. those that exist as a separate legal entity and have limited liability) are
required to ﬁle annual accounts.22 There are two types of annual accounts: full and abbreviated.
22See Behrens et al. (2010) for details about this requirement.
22Table 2: Firm Survival and Export Growth
Export Growth After 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years
Mean 0.2659 0.4855 0.7606 1.3041
Median 0.2240 0.4116 0.6585 1.2368
Stand. dev. 1.6306 1.7928 2.0532 2.2952
5th percentile -2.3717 -2.3670 -2.5085 -2.3651
95th percentile 2.9080 3.4781 4.2075 5.1145
Surviving Triples 63,970 40,010 24,059 12,073
Surviving Firms 19,452 12,757 8,220 4,159
Surviving Countries 198 194 181 168
Firms have to ﬁle a full annual account when they meet at least two of the following three criteria:
() employ at least 50 employees; () have an annual turnover of more than euros 7.3 million; ()
report total assets of more than 3.65 million euros. We use all companies that ﬁled either a full or
an abbreviated balance sheet during the period 1996-1998 while reporting at least one employee.
We use ﬁrms’ annualized balance sheets to construct the following ﬁrm control variables: ()
ﬁrm size,  (log of full-time equivalent number of employees); () labor productivity, 
(log of value added per worker); () capital intensity,  (log of capital stock/employment); ()
()a v e r a g ew a g e , (log of total wage bill/employment); () and a full set of NACE rev1.1
2-digit sectoral dummies. Firm and trade data were merged using the VAT number, which uniquely
identiﬁes ﬁrms in Belgium.
Country-Level Data and Variables The key variable in our analysis is the “Rule of Law” index
from Kaufmann et al. (2009), which we label as . Ranging from −25 to 25, it corresponds to
a weighted average of several variables that measure individuals’ perceptions of the eﬀectiveness
and predictability of the judiciary and the enforcement of contracts in each destination  in year .
This is a fairly accurate description of our theoretical institutional variable. This measure, which is
widely used, also has the important advantage of classifying a large number of countries (170). As
institutions change only very slowly over time, almost all the variation in  is cross-sectional.23
For simplicity of the interpretation we therefore consider the value of  for the destinations of the
new triples in 1996-1998, but not the triﬂing changes in  from period  to period  + .I nt h e
online Appendix we show the list of all countries and their corresponding rule of law score in 1997.
We provide results for alternative measures of  in subsection 54.
23For example, the correlation between  and +10 for the new triples in  =1996, 1997, 1998 is 0.97.
23Other control variables at the country-level include the usual set of gravity equation covariates:
the log of distance (), an ex-colony dummy (), a common language dummy (),
a common border dummy (), and the log of a country GDP in euros (). Except
for , which we borrow from the World Outlook Database provided by the International
Monetary Fund (imf), these data are time-invariant and come from the Centre d’Etude Prospectives
et d’Informations Internationales; full details can be found in Head and Mayer (2002).
To account for diﬀerences in trade patterns and their evolution over time that are related to
membership to the WTO and/or to the integrated EU economic market, we use time-varying WTO
()a n dE Um e m b e r s h i p( ) dummies. To control for the level of development of export
destination countries we also consider an OECD membership dummy (). In the analysis
of export growth and survival we further include changes in the time-varying country variables as
well as real exchange rate changes over the time interval [ + ]. Nominal Exchange rate data
are obtained from the imf’s International Financial Statistics database while PPP conversion rate
data come from the World Outlook Database.
5 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis is divided in two parts. In one we study a ﬁrm’s choice of the initial value
to export to a market, which depends on its prior decision to enter the market. In the other we
study a ﬁrm’s export growth in a country, which in turn depends on the ﬁrm’s decision to keep
exporting to that country. In each part of the empirical analysis we face, therefore, a potential
selection bias. Furthermore, the usual problem of omitted variables arising in non-experimental
settings might apply to our analysis. We deal with these issues in two diﬀerent ways.
In subsection 52 we use ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects. The main advantage of this approach is that it
allows us to control for both potentially observable (ﬁrm productivity, capital intensity etc.) and
typically unobservable (e.g. the quality of a ﬁrm management and products) ﬁrm characteristics.
Importantly, it also controls for arbitrarily correlated time-varying shocks to those characteristics,
which simultaneously aﬀect the ﬁrm’s decision to enter/stay in a market and the ﬁrm’s choice
of how much to sell to that market. Bearing in mind that selection bias is a particular form of
omitted variables bias, this approach allows us to eﬀectively address both problems at the ﬁrm-time
dimension, with the identifying variation stemming from the same ﬁrm entering/staying in at least
two markets in the same year. This is rather demanding on the data, however, as it relies on ﬁrms
entering in the same year in more than one destination and keeping serving multiple destinations.
24After 10 years, for example, rather than the 12K surviving triples indicated in Table 2, we identify
our parameters from around 8K surviving triples corresponding to ﬁrms that entered multiple
destinations within a year and kept at least two of them after ten years.
In subsection 53 we adopt instead an alternative two-stage Heckman procedure where we model
entry and survival more explicitly. With this approach we can address selection problems arising at
the ﬁrm-country-year dimension. Furthermore, it allows us to exploit more variation in the data.
The main cost is that we need to rely on economically sensible ﬁrm-year-country-speciﬁce x c l u s i o n
variables. We do so by constructing our exclusion variables building on the idea of “extended
gravity” forces proposed by Morales et al. (2011). We defer the details of this approach until
subsection 53.
We describe in the next subsection the econometric model we use in our analysis along with
the hypotheses needed for ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects and the Heckman two-stage procedure to provide
consistent estimates.
5.1 Econometric Model
In the ﬁrst part of our empirical analysis we consider both the probability of ﬁrm  entering a
new export destination and its initial volume of exports. We consider ﬁrm entry into a new
export destination in 1996, 1997 and 1998 and pool observations together. To estimate the entry
probability, we deﬁne a binary dependent variable  taking value one when ﬁrm  enters a
new export market  at time .T oc o n s t r u c t,w eﬁrst identify the ﬁrm-country () pairs
appearing in the trade data in period  −1.W et h e nﬁll in the country  dimension with zeros for
all destinations to which ﬁrm  has zero exports in −1.  =1if in period  ﬁrm  serves a
destination  that was in that group. Thus in each period a ﬁrm decides whether to enter into one
or more new export destinations, with the set of countries to choose from given by the countries
where the ﬁrm did not export to in the previous year.
If ﬁrm  enters destination  at time , it also chooses how much to sell in . The initial (log)
export value 0
 is thus observed only when  =1 , raising a selection issue that we




 =  + 1 + Z10
γ1 + 1;( 1 0 )
0
 =  + 2 + Z20
γ2 + 2,( 1 1 )
25where ∗
 is a latent variable measuring ﬁrm  proﬁtability when serving country  as a new
exporter in year ,  is our key variable of interest, Z1 and Z2 are vectors of ﬁrm-country-time
controls, and 1 and 2 are residual terms.
Even if standard omitted variables were not an issue, as when 1 and 2 are uncorrelated
with , Z1 and Z2, selection bias arises as long as 1 and 2 are correlated between
each other. In subsection 52 we use ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects to deal with endogeneity by making the
following assumptions. First, we consider that 1=1+1 and 2=2+2. Second, we
assume 1 and 2 to be uncorrelated with each other as well as with 1, 2 and covariates.
Leaving the correlation between 1, 2 and covariates unconstrained, our set of assumptions
is suﬃcient (along with standard regularity conditions on the distribution of 1 and 2)f o r
parameters in (10) and (11) to be separately and consistently estimated. In particular, marginal
eﬀects of (10) around the mean of covariates can be consistently estimated using a linear probability
model and applying the within transformation to get rid of the ﬁrm-time ﬁxed eﬀects 1.As i m p l e
linear panel regression with ﬁrm-time ﬁxed eﬀects does the same for (11).
In subsection 53 we tackle the issue of selection bias arising at the ﬁrm-country-year dimension.
While compromising on ﬁrm-time omitted variables by using a large battery of covariates instead
of ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects, we allow 1 and 2 to be correlated also along the country dimension.
Assuming normality of residuals (along with standard regularity conditions), parameters of (10) and
(11) can be consistently estimated with a two-stage Heckman procedure. In this case, convincing
identiﬁcation relies on economically sensible exclusion variables, i.e. covariates which are in Z1
but not in Z2.
In the second part of our analysis we turn to the study of survival and export growth in a
new export destination. We consider ﬁrms that have entered market  as a new exporter (in 1996,
1997 and 1998) and are still selling to  after  years. We carry out a survival analysis of length
 =1 2510, thus requiring the full time coverage (1995-2008) of our trade data. We apply the
same econometric model, assumptions, and tools described above while replacing entry with survival
and the initial value of exports with export growth. Speciﬁcally, we consider a binary dependent
variable 
 taking value 1 if ﬁrm , which entered market  in year , is still exporting to
 after  periods.24 Conditional upon survival in country  after  periods (i.e. 
 =1 ),
ﬁrm  also chooses how much (in logs) to sell in , 
. Combined with the initial (log) amount
24One could, alternatively, estimate a parameterized hazard function to study survival. However, such an alternative
has two main drawbacks. First, a hazard function would impose more restrictions on the time proﬁle of survival than
what we do by estimating a probit or a linear probability model for every . Second, to the best of our knowledge, a
duration model featuring unobserved heterogeneity and Heckman-type selection does not exist.
26of exports, this determines export growth from period 0 to period , 
.
5.2 Estimation with Firm-Year Fixed Eﬀects
5.2.1 Firms’ Entry into a New Market and the Initial Value of Exports
When using ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects, the vectors of controls Z1 and Z2 include all the country
and country-time variables discussed in section 4. Table 4 reports the results of the within estimator
applied to the linear probability model (10)a n dt h el i n e a rr e g r e s s i o n( 11). Note that the number
of observations in the estimation of (11) does not correspond to the number of triples in Table 1
because about 2% of observations is lost due to the lack of country-time covariates. We provide
standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering at the ﬁrm and country levels.
In the ﬁst two columns we do not include covariates; in columns 3 and 4 we include all country
and country-year controls. The estimates of the covariates’ coeﬃcients in both the entry and the
level regressions are largely consistent with existing studies. The sign and signiﬁcance of the 
coeﬃcient in the initial exports regression conﬁrms Prediction 1: all else equal, a ﬁrm enters into
a new export market with higher sales, the higher is the eﬀectiveness of contracting institutions in
the country. This result suggests that  can be partially understood as a proxy for lower variable
costs. The eﬀect is non-trivial. For example, considering the point estimate in column 4 of Table
4, if Brazil ( = −21) had institutions like Chile ( =1 22), exporters to Brazil would start their
sales there with a 46% higher initial export value.
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5.2.2 Firms’ Survival in a New Market and the Growth Rate of Exports
The vector of controls in the case of survival and export growth in a new export destination
includes the same set of country and country-time variables used in Table 4 plus other variables
needed when considering these features. First, as emphasized by Arkolakis (2010) and Eaton et al.
(2010), among others, the initial value of exports is crucial to understand ﬁrms’ export growth in a
market. Second, we account for the changes in some country controls between periods  and  + 
25The sign and signiﬁcance of the  coeﬃcient in the entry regression indicates that, ceteris paribus, it is easier
to enter markets characterized by good institutions. While probably intuitive, this result does not follow from our
model because of countervailing eﬀects. On one hand, a higher  implies a larger extensive margin; on the other
hand, it induces a lower turnover rate. The model is silent about the net eﬀect stemming from those two contrasting
forces. This helps to explain the (statistically signiﬁcant but) economically small impact of  on entry. The small
magnitude is however virtually inevitable, as entry by a ﬁrm in a speciﬁc market in a speciﬁc year is a very rare
event.
27(in addition to the levels of those variables). Speciﬁcally, we add the change in the EU membership
(∆), the change in OECD membership (∆), and the change in WTO membership
(∆) experienced by some countries during our sample period. We also introduce the %
change of the real exchange rate of country  with respect to the euro (∆) and the change
in the GDP of country  in current euros (∆). All those variables are likely to aﬀect export
growth and may be correlated with our main independent variable.26 Table 5 shows the results of
our within estimations. We report standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering at the ﬁrm and
country levels.
The sign and signiﬁcance of the  coeﬃcient in the survival analysis after  years conﬁrm
Prediction 2: the likelihood that an exporter to a new destination market will still serve that market
after  years increases with the eﬀectiveness of the contracting institutions of the country. This
result indicates that  has not only static but also dynamic eﬀects on ﬁrms exporting to .T h e
magnitude of the eﬀect is sizeable. For example, using the unconditional probability of survival as
reference, if China ( = −025) had institutions like those in Singapore ( =1 74), the probability
of survival of an exporter to China after one year would increase by 58% (199 × 0011904089).
After 10 years, the eﬀects is over 13% (199 × 0005200776).
The sign and signiﬁcance of the  coeﬃcient in the export growth analysis after  years
conﬁrm Prediction 3:aﬁrm’s export growth to a market in its ﬁrst  years is lower, the greater
the eﬀectiveness of the country’s contracting institutions. This result further conﬁrms the dynamic
implications of , which cannot be rationalized in frameworks where  is taken simply as a proxy
for ﬁxed, sunk or variable costs. The magnitude of the eﬀect is remarkably sizeable: if China had
institutions like those in Singapore, export growth of individual ﬁrms to China would be around
53% lower after one year, and almost 25% lower after 10 years.
Interestingly, by combining the previously estimated positive eﬀect of  on the initial level of
exports (00312) with the negative eﬀect of  on growth after  years, one ﬁnds that, if all else were
kept constant, after two years the average level of exports would already be higher to countries with
lower , with the diﬀerence increasing at longer horizons. Of course, this eﬀect is for surviving
exporters, and needs to be weighted against the ﬁnding that survival rates increase with .I t
nevertheless highlights the nuanced role that contracting institutions play in international trade.
26Several of these additional controls are indeed statistically signiﬁcant. We report their estimates in the online
Appendix.
285.3 Estimation with Heckman 2-step Procedure
Firm-year ﬁxed eﬀects allow us to control for a wide range of both potentially observable and
typically unobservable time-varying ﬁrm characteristics that simultaneously aﬀect entry, survival,
the initial level of exports and export growth. However, that strategy has two drawbacks. First,
there might be market-speciﬁc unobservable characteristics aﬀecting entry and selection that we
are unable to capture with our covariates. Second, the identifying variation comes from a rather
speciﬁcs a m p l e : ﬁrms entering in the same year in two or more destinations and experiencing
diﬀerent survival and export growth patterns.
To account for these concerns we estimate, building on the assumption laid down in subsection
5.1, two separate two-stage Heckman procedures: one for entry and the initial level of exports, and
one for survival and export growth. In both cases, we need exclusion variables that directly aﬀect
the likelihood of entry and survival into a new destination market while, conditional on entry and on
survival, do not aﬀect the initial value of exports and export growth. We follow Morales et al. (2011)
and use information about the trade history of a ﬁrm to construct “extended gravity” measures that
proxy for market-ﬁrm-year-speciﬁc sunk entry costs. Speciﬁcally, we construct four variables that
capture the “proximity” between the set of countries a ﬁrm was already exporting to in year  − 1
and the new potential markets where a ﬁrm could start exporting to in . Proximity is measured
in terms of both geographical/cultural distance (contiguity, presence in the same continent, and
sharing of the same oﬃcial language) and income similarities (quartiles of the distribution of GDP
per capita in US dollars across countries in 2008).27 Intuitively, once a ﬁrm exports to a market,
it acquires knowledge of that market, and such a knowledge could be useful when entering other
destinations that share similar characteristics with the initial one.
To the extent that the four extended gravity variables capture mostly ﬁrm-market-year-speciﬁc
sunk costs, they represent valid exclusion variables, directly aﬀecting entry and survival into a new
export destination but, conditional on entry and survival, not inﬂuencing export level and growth.
Morales et al. (2011) ﬁnd that extended gravity variables are indeed important determinants
of ﬁrms’ sunk entry cost into a market, but not of ﬁrms’ ﬁxed cost to exporting to a market.
Although they do not study ﬁrms’ variable cost of exporting, their ﬁnding that extended gravity
variables do not aﬀect ﬁrms’ ﬁxed cost of exporting suggests that these factors–unlike “regular”
gravity variables–are unrelated to ﬁrms’ operating proﬁts in foreign markets, hence valid exclusion
restrictions.28
27See Morales et al. (2011) for details on the construction of those four variables.
28Indeed, in a related analysis Lawless (2011) ﬁnds that exporting to a country facilitates entry in countries
29T h ec o s to fi m p l e m e n t i n gt h eH e c k m a np r o c e d u r ei st h a tw ec a n n o tb ea sg e n e r a li nt e r m so f
the ﬁrm-year characteristics aﬀecting entry, survival, export value and growth. However, by using
balance sheet information we can consider a wide range of time-varying ﬁrm characteristics that
proxy for heterogeneity in marginal costs: ﬁrm size, productivity, capital intensity, average wage,
as well as a full set of NACE rev1.1 2-digit sectoral dummies. Furthermore, to capture how well
a ﬁrm is established in international markets, we introduce the number of destinations served by
ﬁrm  at time , _. The requirement of balance sheet information reduces the number of
observations available for estimation by roughly one third, however. We include time dummies,
cluster standard errors at the country level and provide marginal eﬀects for the ﬁrst-stage probit.
5.3.1 Estimation Results
Tables 6 and 7 report the results. They reveal that our predictions about the impact of a country’s
contracting institutions on the value of foreign ﬁrms’ initial sales, survival and sales growth are
overall very robust to this alternative speciﬁcation. Reassuringly, the extended gravity variables
are all highly signiﬁcant, conﬁrming that ﬁrm entry is indeed more likely in markets similar/close
to the markets previously served by that ﬁrm. Furthermore, the signiﬁcance of the Inverse Mill
ratio (IM) indicates that selection on unobservables 1 and 2, as captured by our extended
gravity variables, is indeed at work.
The impact of  on initial exports, as Table 6 shows, is very similar to that obtained with
ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects (Table 4). In turn, Table 7 shows that the impact of  on survival after one
year is over 3 times higher than the one obtained with ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects (Table 5), although the
diﬀerence between the point estimates with the two approaches decreases for longer periods. For
export growth, the eﬀect of  under the Heckman procedure is higher than under the ﬁrm-year
ﬁxed eﬀects for longer horizons ( =5 10), but lower for shorter horizons ( =1 2). Interestingly,
the role of the extended gravity variables on survival is often but not always positive. This is
probably the net eﬀect of two opposing forces: more familiarity with a market can increase survival
there, but it also represents a lower sunk cost to assess the market, which implies a higher likelihood
of exit following a negative shock.
To get a general view of the economic magnitude of our results, we use our point estimates
contiguous to the original destination, but that contiguity has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the volume of sales
to the new destination.
30under each speciﬁcation to compare the eﬀects of (a one standard deviation increase in) the rule of
law measure on our variables of interest with the eﬀects of (a one standard deviation increase in)
GDP and of (a one standard deviation decrease in) distance, the two variables often believed to be
the main determinants of aggregate bilateral trade ﬂows. Table 3 displays the results.
Table 3: % change associated to a one standard deviation change in ,G D Pa n dD i s t a n c e
Firm-year FEs Heckman two-stage
: 3.2% 2.9%
on 








10:G D P : 106.4% 79.5%
Distance: 20.3% 17.5%
Institutional quality pales next to GDP in terms of their eﬀects on ﬁrms’ initial export sales
and 10-year export growth. On the other hand, it has a bigger eﬀect than GDP on ﬁrms’ survival
rates. Relative to distance, the impact of institutions is smaller on initial export sales but roughly
equivalent on survival and export growth. Overall, then, our results indicate that the magnitude
of the impact of institutional quality on ﬁrm export dynamics are far from trivial.
5.4 Robustness: Export Thresholds, Alternative Measures of , Excluding 0
As indicated above, the declaration threshold requirements has changed for exports to EU countries
during our sample period, reaching 1 million per year in 2006. To investigate whether these
changes bias our results, we re-run all of our speciﬁcations restricting the sample. Speciﬁcally, we
consider only triples corresponding to ﬁr m st h a te x p o r ta tl e a s t1 million per year to either the
group of EU countries, or the group of non-EU countries, or to both groups.29
We also check whether our results are sensitive to diﬀerent measures of institutional strength.
We consider both a measure of the quality of the legal system provided by Gwartney and Lawson
29In the online Appendix we deal with the changes in the declaration requirements in two additional ways. First,
we restrict the sample to 1998 to 2005, a period where the requirements did not change. The cost of that approach
is that we can look at survival and growth after at most six years after entry and for one cohort only. Second, we
restrict the sample to non-EU exports to completely sidestep the problem created by the change in thresholds. The
cost of that approach is the loss of signiﬁcant variation in the data, as most of Belgium’s exports go to other EU
countries.
31(2003) and the cost of enforcing a contract as a percent of the debt value from the World Bank’s
2011 Doing Business database.
Finally, we re-run our original regressions for survival and export growth without controlling
for the initial quantity. As we pointed out above, many researchers deem a ﬁrm’s initial export
level to a market key to understand the ﬁrm’s future performance in that market. Our model (and
our estimates) indicate, however, that the initial exports also capture the eﬀects of the institutional
environment of the country. Having the initial exports in those regressions therefore should neu-
tralize part of the eﬀect of  on survival and export growth. We check here the eﬀect of dropping
0
 as a control in those regressions.
Results using ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects and the two-step Heckman procedure are displayed in Tables
8 and 9. To save space, we show only the estimates and standard errors of . Overall, the broad
picture is qualitatively fairly similar to the one obtained with all export triples, with the rule of law
measure for institutions, and with initial exports as a control in the survival and growth regressions.
Insert Tables 8 and 9 around here
5.5 Diﬀerential Results: Diﬀerent Goods, Firms and Export Modes
Our empirical results provide consistent support for the three ﬁrm-level predictions of our model.
The most surprising of them is the result on export growth: surviving exporters expand their foreign
sales faster in countries with weaker institutions. The explanation our model oﬀers is that exporters
learn through experience about the quality of their matches, a process that is faster in economies
whose institutions impose relatively lax constraints on agents’ behavior. This diﬀerential learning
across destinations is, however, likely to be heterogeneous across diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. First,
ﬁrms with diﬀerent characteristics, or that sell diﬀerent types of products, are likely to be aﬀected
diﬀerently. Second, some ﬁrms may actively take actions to mitigate those informational problems.
In this sense, our results capture only a lower bound for their consequences for ﬁrms’ export
dynamics, or the residual consequences once countervailing actions by the ﬁrms that otherwise
would be more aﬀected are factored in. To investigate these possibilities, we run additional export
growth estimations interacting our institutional variable with other variables that could aﬀect the
scope for learning from previous experiences.30
First, we interact  with a dummy variable that indicates whether ﬁrm  has an aﬃliate and/or
30In the online Appendix we show further robustness checks where we include in all the main regressions controls
for the presence of parents/aﬃliates and indexes for the complexity of products. Qualitative results are very similar.
32a parent company in country  in year .31 If uncertainty about the reliability of trading partners is
signiﬁcant, ﬁrms may consider acquiring the partners so that they can monitor their actions more
eﬀectively. This would tend to mitigate the impact of institutions on export growth. On the other
hand, foreign direct investment brings its own types of institutionally related issues, such as the
risk of expropriation and property rights uncertainty, which may be even worse than dealing with
unreliable distributors, in particular because FDI typically requires large initial outlays.
Second, we interact  with a measure of the good’s “complexity,” as deﬁned and developed
by Nunn (2007).32 If the actions/services that importers have to provide are more numerous
and/or less veriﬁable for more complex goods, which seems likely, then there will be more scope for
opportunistic behavior when dealing with exporters of complex goods. If so, the negative impact of
institutional quality on ﬁrms’ export growth would tend to be magniﬁed for more complex goods.
Third, we interact  with measures of “ﬁrm experience,” which we proxy with the number of
foreign markets served and, alternatively, with the size of the ﬁrm (measured by total employment),
as larger ﬁrms are usually older and more established. Intuitively, if experienced ﬁrms are more
able to screen reliable from non-reliable distributors, the impact of institutional quality on export
g r o w t hw o u l dt e n dt ob ep l a y e dd o w nf o rt h o s eﬁrms.
Finally, we interact  with a dummy for “wholesalers”.33 The new but fast-growing literature on
the choice between direct and indirect exporting ﬁnds that wholesalers help to overcome ﬁxed costs
of exporting (see e.g. Bernard et al. 2011). As Feenstra and Hanson (2004) argue, informational
frictions constitute an important element of those ﬁxed costs.34 But as our model indicates, infor-
mational frictions can aﬀect also the dynamic pattern of exporters in institutionally weak countries.
Thus, the same reasons that are associated with a stronger impact of institutions on ﬁrms’ export
growth also favor indirect exporting. Unless choosing to export through wholesalers neutralizes
31The dummy is constructed based on the inward and outward micro foreign direct investment (FDI) data collected
by the nbb.A n a ﬃliate relationship arises whenever ﬁrm  owns, either directly or indirectly, at least 10% of the
equity of a ﬁrm registered in another country. A parent relationship arises whenever at least 10% of the equity of
ﬁrm  is owned by a ﬁrm registered in another country.
32Speciﬁcally, we match Nunn’s (2007) data to the CN 8-digit nomenclature and construct the weighted average
of the complexity of the CN 8-digit products sold by ﬁrm  when entering a new market  at time  using the export
shares of such products as weights.
33Wholesalers are deﬁned as ﬁrms whose main NACE rev1.1 2-digit sector of activity is either 50 or 51. Manufac-
turing ﬁrms are instead those whose main activity NACE code is between [15, 37]. Firms with other NACE codes are
classiﬁed as others. In the regressions we take manufacturing ﬁrms as the reference category and include dummies
for wholesalers and others, along with an interaction term between each of the two dummies and .
34Feenstra and Hanson (2004) associate greater informational frictions with more product diﬀerentiation. Tang
and Zhang (2011) show that the association is actually more subtle. While horizontally diﬀerentiated products, on
which Feenstra and Hanson focus, tend to be exported through intermediaries, vertically diﬀerentiated products, for
which quality considerations play an important role, tend to be exported directly.
33completely the eﬀects of information frictions, we should then observe a stronger impact of  on
export growth for wholesalers than for manufacturers.
In all these exercises, we use our two benchmark speciﬁc a t i o n sa d d e db ya ne x t r av a r i a b l e
and its interaction with . For brevity, we report only the coeﬃcients and standard errors of the
interaction term.35
Table 10 shows the results. We do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerential eﬀect of
institutional quality on export growth for ﬁrms with related parties in the foreign countries they
export to. This may seem surprising at ﬁrst, but most likely it simply reﬂects the endogeneity
of FDI decisions: as in many other developed countries, multinational activities in Belgium are
overwhelmingly concentrated in institutionally strong economies.36 W ew o u l dn e e da ne x t e n d e d
model that takes into account FDI decisions to guide an empirical strategy that allows for a complete
examination of this issue, but this ﬁrst look at the data does not point to FDI as a widely used
“remedy” for institutional uncertainty in foreign markets.
We ﬁnd, on the other hand, some evidence that the impact of institutions on ﬁrms’ export growth
is larger if the ﬁrm is exporting more complex goods, consistent with the view that information
frictions and the scope for learning are greater for exports of relatively complex goods.
By contrast, we ﬁnd strong evidence that institutions matter signiﬁcantly less for export growth
for experienced (both larger and more diversiﬁed geographically) ﬁrms. Presumably, those ﬁrms
are more able to assess the reliability of distributors before forming a match, and therefore they
have less to learn about their partners over time.
We also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of institutional quality on export growth is higher for wholesalers
than for manufacturers. This is consistent with the view that indirect exporting tends to be pre-
35Evidently, these are not the only ways in which exporting ﬁrms try to limit proﬁt-damaging opportunistic actions
of foreign partners, only the ones we can address with our data. A dimension we do not explore, for example, is
t h ec h o i c eo fﬁnancing modes (e.g. between cash in advance, open accounts and letters of credit). Antràs and Foley
(2011) study precisely that, including the evolution of ﬁnancing modes over time within partnerships. Data that
allow such types of analysis are rare. Indeed, Antràs and Foley use data from a single exporting ﬁrm in their study
(although their ﬁrm is as close to the perfect specimen for their analysis as possible, as it has multiple partners in
various destinations over several years). They ﬁnd that cash in advance is more likely to be used in countries with
weak institutions than open accounts despite higher ﬁnancing costs there, but that such a diﬀerence disappears over
time among surviving partnerships. This is akin to our result that exports start lower but grow faster in countries
with weak institutions than in countries with strong institutions. There are also other factors that can matter for
the dynamics of exporting ﬁrms but that are not present in Belgium. For example, Fernandes and Tang (2011) show
that the existence of export processing ﬁrms in China increases the survival rates of other, regular exporting ﬁrms
from the same city and in the same sector.
36Out of the 157,537 initial export triples, the exporting ﬁrm has a parent/subsidiary link in only 432. Of those
links, 86% correspond to exports to OECD member countries. This fraction reaches 95% ten years after entry.
34ferred when informational barriers are relatively important. An alternative interpretation is that
manufacturers have a better technology to assess the type of a match before starting a relationship,
whereas wholesalers have a better technology to ﬁnd (but not to screen) importers. A full ratio-
nalization of this ﬁnding, which would require endogenizing the choice of export mode, is however
beyond the scope of this paper.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Recent research has highlighted the signiﬁcant changes exporting ﬁrms go through in their foreign
destinations–e.g. entry and exit rates are both high, and swings in destination-speciﬁcs a l e s
are large–but which had for a long time been eclipsed by the relative stability of aggregate trade
ﬂows. We know very little, however, about the economic factors that aﬀect this dynamic pattern. A
separate line of research has showed that countries’ contracting institutions matter for the level and
structure of aggregate trade ﬂows. There have not been, however, attempts at understanding how,
or whether, institutions shape the dynamics of exporting ﬁrms. In this paper we do precisely that,
in a way merging and extending the insights of those distinct literatures. We show that, comparing
two otherwise identical countries, a ﬁrm exporting to them will tend to start with higher volumes
and serve for a longer period the country with better institutions. However, if the ﬁrm kept serving
both destinations, its export growth will be higher to the country with worse institutions. Thus,
(weak) contracting institutions represent not simply a type of ﬁxed or sunk costs for exporting
ﬁrms, as the literature on institutions and aggregate trade may suggest.37 They also aﬀect the
dynamics of exporting ﬁrms in fundamental ways–as if ﬁrms’ marginal cost of exporting changed
overtime depending on their export experience and at diﬀerent speeds in diﬀerent markets.
We generate these predictions in the context of a very simple model designed to highlight the
essential features of the mechanism we want to study. In particular, the model relies on the simple
idea that, in countries with weak institutions, opportunistic behavior is relatively unconstrained.
This can prevent economic relationships from arising and tends to depress the initial size of those
that form. On the other hand, it also provides agents with a more fertile environment where they can
build private reputations within their relationships. We develop this logic to study the relationships
exporters to a country need to have with local importers in order to reach ﬁnal consumers there. We
test our predictions using a rich ﬁrm-destination-level panel of Belgian exporters serving virtually
all countries in the world over 14 years. We identify our parameters using two alternative methods.
37This is the interpretation of, among others, Do and Levchenko (2009).
35I no n ew eu s eﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects, which allow us to control for all ﬁrm-level characteristics,
including those that change over time and/or are typically unobservable. In the other we model
more explicitly ﬁrms’ choices of markets to enter and stay, relying on exclusion restrictions based on
the concept of “extended gravity” forces. We ﬁnd support for our predictions from both approaches.
Understanding this dynamic behavior is central to fully comprehending the welfare implications
of international trade ﬂows. After all, as for example Eaton et al. (2008) show for Colombian
ﬁrms, new exporters generally contribute little to aggregate exports and display high failure rates.
However, over several years the successful new exporters account for almost half of total export
growth. But as our analysis makes clear, this dynamic pattern is very diﬀerent across markets,
implying potentially important consequences for aggregate trade ﬂows, as well as for similar trade
policies implemented in diﬀerent countries.
Now, our model and its predictions are about a general problem that tends to arise when
ﬁrms seek to serve a diﬀerent foreign market. Naturally, they should apply diﬀerently to diﬀerent
sectors and ﬁrms. Furthermore, when the problem is serious enough, it should also prompt the
aﬀected ﬁrms to take actions to mitigate it. What we observe is therefore only the “net eﬀect” after
such actions are implemented, and in that sense our main estimates provide only a lower bound
for its severity. We do provide additional empirical results highlighting the circumstances where
the learning of ﬁrms about their foreign relationships–as reﬂected in their destination-speciﬁc
export growth–are likely to be more or less important, by looking at diﬀerential eﬀects for more
experienced ﬁrms, for ﬁrms that have a parent/subsidiary in the destination country, for exports
that take place through wholesalers, and for ﬁrms that export more complex goods. This is just
a ﬁrst step, however. A much closer scrutiny is necessary to give us a fuller view of how weak
institutions aﬀect the dynamics of diﬀerent ﬁrms in foreign markets and the actions ﬁrms take (or
not) to mitigate that diﬃculty. Given the ﬂexible structure of our model, it is amenable to several
extensions aimed at a closer look at this question, in ways that would possibly be testable with
existing ﬁrm-level datasets. We look forward to future research in this direction.
Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . First, since (;) maximizes (;),i tm u s tb et h eq u a n t i t y
established in any contract.
Now ﬁx some date and consider a producer who is not in a partnership and ﬁnds a business
opportunity. If he decides to take this opportunity, he obtains (where “0” denotes the event “no
36default” and () is the value function of a producer in a partnership with a distributor with
reputation 1 − )
(0)=(0)+ Pr(0 | 0)(1).( 1 2 )
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We now show that
(0)















−(1 − )[( 0
0+1−0;)]
(1 − 0 + 0)2  0.







is decreasing in 0,i tm u s tb et h a t
(0)
0  0.A sa
result, there exists a unique  ∈ (01) such that ()=0 .T h u s ,i f0   we have that (0)  0
and it is optimal to enter a partnership. Otherwise, it is not. Finally, if a producer observes
a default, his posterior belief becomes 1;s i n c e(1)  0, he terminates the partnership. If the
producer does not observe a default, he increases the belief that the distributor is patient; since
() is strictly decreasing, he continues in the partnership.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . Since the producer pays the cost of production, it is always optimal for
the distributor to participate in a partnership. Moreover, since an unmatched distributor faces a
stationary problem, she wants to form a partnership with the ﬁrst producer she meets. Consider
then an ongoing partnership that has lasted for  periods. The distributor follows the prescribed
strategy and does not default even if he has the opportunity to do so if and only if

1 − 
≥  + [(;)],
37which can be rewritten as

1 − 
 ≥ [(;)].( 1 4 )
















such that a patient distributor never
defaults if and only if  ≥ .











where  and  satisfy
+1 =( 1− ) +( 1− )(b  − ),( 1 5 )
+1 =( 1− ) +( 1− )(1 −b  − ).( 1 6 )
We will prove that b +1 ≥ b  by induction. First, since 0 = b  and 0 =1−b ,w eh a v et h a tb 1 ≥ b 0
as long as
1(1 −b ) ≥ 1b .
Substituting for 1 and 1 using +1 and +1 above, we ﬁnd that this inequality is always true,
since 1. Now assume that b  ≥ b −1. If we substitute for  and ,w ec a nr e w r i t et h i s
inequality as
(1 − )b  ≥ (1 − ) + (1 − )(1 −b ).( 1 7 )
We need to show that (17) implies b +1 ≥ b , which is equivalent to
(1 − )b  ≥ (1 − )(1 − ) +( 1− )(1 −b ).( 1 8 )
Therefore, a suﬃcient condition for (18) to hold is that
(1 − ) + (1 − )(1 −b ) ≥ (1 − )(1 − ) +( 1− )(1 −b ),
38which simpliﬁes to
[1 − (1 − )] ≥ (1 − )(1 −b ).
Since  is a strictly decreasing sequence, it is suﬃcient to show that
[1 − (1 − )] ≥ (1 − )(1 −b ),
which is true, given the expression for  in (8).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . We have to show that inequality (9) holds. Since   0, the direct
eﬀect is negative. In what follows we prove that the indirect eﬀect is also negative:
 (0 − )

 0.( 1 9 )
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(1 − )(1− + )
0(1 − 0),
we can rewrite (21)a s
−
h
(1 − (1 − )0)2 − 
i 
(1 − )(1− + )
− −1  0.( 2 2 )
If
£
(1 − (1 − )0)2 − ¤
≥ 0, then it is immediate that (22) is negative. Hence, we only need to
consider the case where
£
(1 − (1 − )0)2 − ¤
 0. We need to show that
−1
 − (1 − (1 − )0)2 

(1 − )(1− + )
.( 2 3 )
Since the left-hand side of (23) is decreasing in 0,i ts u ﬃces to consider the case where 0 =1 :

1 −  

(1 − )(1− + )
.( 2 4 )
It is straightforward to show that the left-hand side of (24)i si n c r e a s i n gi n. Thus, we only need





(1 − )(1− + )
.
39After some manipulation, we can rewrite this inequality as
(1 − )
2 + 2(1 − )  0,
concluding the proof.
P r o o fo fP r e d i c t i o n3 . We can express export growth from period  to period  +  as
(ln − ln0).I ti sa ﬀected by  as follows:
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which is true from Proposition 2.
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42Table 4: Entry Into a New Export Market and the Initial Value of Exports
Dependent Variable Entry Value Entry Value
Type Binary Continuous Binary Continuous
Probability of Entry 0.0140 — 0.0146 —






(0.0001) (0.0107) (0.0001) (0.0077)
Controls

































Firm-Year ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Observations 11,118,379 155,694 10,575,194 154,882

2 0.0071 0.0064 0.0296 0.0595
Two-way clustered (country ﬁrm) standard errors in parentheses.
 indicate the




43Table 5: Survival in a New Export Market and the Growth Rate of Exports
Dependent Variable Market Export Market Export Market Export Market Export
Survival Growth Survival Growth Survival Growth Survival Growth
Type Binary Continuous Binary Continuous Binary Continuous Binary Continuous
Years After Entry≡  k = 1Y e a r k = 2Y e a r s k = 5Y e a r s k = 10 Years
Prob. of Survival Upon Entry 0.4089 — 0.2562 — 0.1544 — 0.0776 —
The Role of Institutions
 0.0119 -0.0271 0.0135 -0.0600 0.0101 -0.1268 0.0052 -0.1344
(0.0047) (0.0165) (0.0050) (0.0230) (0.0043) (0.0364) (0.0031) (0.0531)
idt, d, and dt Controls
0
 0.0725 -0.4394 0.0692 -0.5043 0.0520 -0.6038 0.0313 -0.7302
(0.0023) (0.0217) (0.0019) (0.0246) (0.0024) (0.0295) (0.0022) (0.0300)
 -0.0285 -0.1089 -0.0276 -0.1365 -0.0234 -0.2024 -0.0182 -0.2127
(0.0043) (0.0190) (0.0041) (0.0231) (0.0036) (0.0370) (0.0032) (0.0579)
 0.0058 -0.0814 -0.0091 -0.0254 -0.0146 -0.1073 -0.0106 0.1006
(0.0141) (0.0279) (0.0157) (0.0375) (0.0139) (0.0559) (0.0101) (0.0679)
 0.0619 0.0126 0.0588 -0.0307 0.0488 0.1160 0.0418 0.4457
(0.0278) (0.0806) (0.0210) (0.1104) (0.0157) (0.2256) (0.0108) (0.2727)
 0.0584 0.3442 0.0635 0.3360 0.0820 0.4051 0.0457 0.4727
(0.0307) (0.0574) (0.0359) (0.0847) (0.0322) (0.1180) (0.0220) (0.1538)
 0.0085 0.0906 0.0025 0.1388 -0.0000 0.2099 0.0015 0.3071
(0.0038) (0.0114) (0.0042) (0.0133) (0.0039) (0.0200) (0.0026) (0.0258)
 0.0589 0.0587 0.0580 0.1308 0.0521 0.0834 0.0332 0.2235
(0.0093) (0.0348) (0.0103) (0.0611) (0.0088) (0.0710) (0.0091) (0.1008)
 0.0237 -0.0447 0.0372 -0.0303 0.0368 0.0196 0.0233 -0.1731
(0.0110) (0.0425) (0.0115) (0.0564) (0.0089) (0.0878) (0.0065) (0.1252)
 0.0289 0.0163 0.0344 -0.0003 0.0353 0.0576 0.0251 0.0420
(0.0096) (0.0295) (0.0091) (0.0440) (0.0083) (0.0868) (0.0059) (0.1568)
C h a n g e sky e a r sa f t e rE n t r yo fd tc o n t r o l sa r ea l s oi n c l u d e d
in estimations, along with real exchange rate changes
Firm-Year ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 154,882 63,330 154,882 39,679 154,882 23,918 154,791 12,019
2 0.0934 0.1763 0.1086 0.2164 0.1069 0.2605 0.0743 0.3414
Two-way clustered (country ﬁrm) standard errors in parentheses.  indicate the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient,  p0.01,
 p0.05,  p0.1.
44Table 6: Entry Into a New Export Market and the Initial Value of Exports: Heckman two-stage procedure
Heckman procedure First step Second step
Dependent Variable Entry Value
Type Binary Continuous
Probability of Entry 0.0167 —











































Industry and Time Dummies YES YES
Observations 5,737,534 95,788
2 0.2186 0.1288
Marginal eﬀects are reported for the ﬁrst step of the Heckman
procedure. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
 indicate the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient,  p0.01, 
p0.05,  p0.1.
45Table 7: Survival in a New Export Market and the Growth Rate of Exports: Heckman two-stage procedure
Heckman procedure First step Second step First step Second step First step Second step First step Second step
Dependent Variable Market Export Market Export Market Export Market Export
Survival Growth Survival Growth Survival Growth Survival Growth
Type Binary Continuous Binary Continuous Binary Continuous Binary Continuous
Years After Entry≡  k = 1Y e a r k = 2Y e a r s k = 5Y e a r s k = 10 Years
Prob. of Survival Upon Entry 0.4505 — 0.2969 — 0.1875 — 0.1000 —
The Role of Institutions
 0.0398 -0.0073 0.0385 -0.0078 0.0257 -0.1421 0.0085 -0.2552
(0.0043) (0.0133) (0.0028) (0.0184) (0.0022) (0.0293) (0.0012) (0.0446)
Excluded Variables and Inverse Mill Ratio
_ 0.0123 — 0.0060 — -0.0033 — -0.0029 —
(0.0108) (0.0053) (0.0035) (0.0015)
_ 0.0244 — 0.0218 — 0.0177 — 0.0048 —
(0.0078) (0.0045) (0.0032) (0.0016)
_ 0.0751 — 0.0200 — 0.0030 — -0.0082 —
(0.0119) (0.0068) (0.0049) (0.0021)
_ 0.1195 — 0.0278 — 0.0098 — 0.0010 —
(0.0124) (0.0074) (0.0055) (0.0024)
IM — 0.0005 — 0.1930 — 0.2116 — -0.0097
(0.0385) (0.0653) (0.1264) (0.2452)
idt and it Controls
0
 0.0762 -0.3472 0.0548 -0.4098 0.0319 -0.5119 0.0116 -0.6478
(0.0023) (0.0067) (0.0014) (0.0106) (0.0009) (0.0190) (0.0005) (0.0342)
_ 0.0261 0.0037 0.0063 0.0051 0.0035 0.0075 0.0016 0.0007
(0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0028) (0.0001) (0.0044)
 0.0150 0.2179 0.0148 0.2969 0.0096 0.3389 0.0079 0.4021
(0.0069) (0.0207) (0.0042) (0.0310) (0.0035) (0.0465) (0.0020) (0.0698)
 0.0060 0.0803 0.0158 0.1187 0.0107 0.1114 0.0079 0.0991
(0.0056) (0.0228) (0.0040) (0.0333) (0.0036) (0.0514) (0.0020) (0.0668)
 -0.0074 0.0352 -0.0028 0.0470 -0.0016 0.0482 0.0000 0.0879
(0.0022) (0.0079) (0.0016) (0.0115) (0.0013) (0.0161) (0.0008) (0.0233)
 -0.0402 -0.0509 -0.0320 -0.0594 -0.0206 0.0318 -0.0112 0.1144
(0.0082) (0.0302) (0.0057) (0.0428) (0.0051) (0.0688) (0.0028) (0.0864)
d and dt Controls
 -0.0051 -0.0822 -0.0071 -0.1339 -0.0048 -0.1950 -0.0041 -0.1855
(0.0037) (0.0117) (0.0023) (0.0151) (0.0016) (0.0226) (0.0009) (0.0377)
 -0.0464 -0.0783 -0.0457 -0.0723 -0.0261 -0.0683 -0.0093 0.1409
(0.0057) (0.0198) (0.0037) (0.0266) (0.0027) (0.0430) (0.0014) (0.0608)
 0.0986 -0.0242 0.0923 0.0423 0.0801 -0.1256 0.0436 -0.1869
(0.0167) (0.0604) (0.0160) (0.0989) (0.0164) (0.1829) (0.0135) (0.3300)
 0.0937 0.1991 0.0460 0.2516 0.0411 0.3427 0.0116 0.3819
(0.0104) (0.0314) (0.0064) (0.0401) (0.0050) (0.0571) (0.0025) (0.0804)
 -0.0281 0.0681 -0.0129 0.1158 -0.0052 0.1677 0.0002 0.2478
(0.0018) (0.0061) (0.0011) (0.0082) (0.0008) (0.0116) (0.0004) (0.0168)
 0.0351 0.0104 0.0350 0.0655 0.0284 0.1425 0.0094 0.3528
(0.0081) (0.0271) (0.0049) (0.0351) (0.0036) (0.0493) (0.0020) (0.0820)
 0.0603 -0.0424 0.0413 -0.0816 0.0256 0.0500 0.0078 -0.0866
(0.0113) (0.0298) (0.0063) (0.0400) (0.0046) (0.0592) (0.0024) (0.0952)
 -0.0089 0.0038 0.0078 0.0032 0.0132 0.0027 0.0106 0.0393
(0.0096) (0.0265) (0.0060) (0.0366) (0.0049) (0.0612) (0.0026) (0.1227)
Changes k years after Entry of it and dt controls are also included
in estimations, along with real exchange rate changes
Industry and Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 95,788 43,154 95,708 28,419 95,654 17,932 95,572 9,555
2 0.6058 0.1551 0.4414 0.2142 0.4129 0.2762 0.4123 0.3452
Marginal eﬀects are reported for the ﬁrst step of the Heckman procedure. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  indicate the
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃ cient,  p0.01,  p0.05,  p0.1.
46Table 8: Entry into a New Export Market and the Initial Value of Exports: only exporters selling over 1
million; alternative measures of 
Dependent Variable Entry Value
Type Binary Continuous
Estimations restricted to exporters







Alternative measures of 
Quality of the legal system







6 - log(cost) of enforcing a contract (as % of debt value)







The three sets of estimations include, for the ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation, the
d ,a n dd tc o n t r o l sl i s t e di nT a b l e4w i t ht w o - w a yc l u s t e r e d( c o u n t r yﬁrm) standard
errors in parentheses. The Heckman speciﬁcation includes the it, d, and dt controls
listed in Table 6 with country-clustered standard errors.  indicate the signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcient,  p0.01,  p0.05,  p0.1.
47Table 9: Survival in a New Export Market and the Growth Rate of Exports: only exporters selling over 1
million; no control for 0
; alternative measures of 
Dependent Variable Market Export Market Export Market Export Market Export
Survival Growth Survival Growth Survival Growth Survival Growth
Type Binary Continuous Binary Continuous Binary Continuous Binary Continuous
Years After Entry≡  k = 1Y e a r k = 2Y e a r s k = 5Y e a r s k = 10 Years
Estimations restricted to exporters selling over 1 million
Firm-time ﬁxed eﬀects:
 0.0276 -0.0096 0.0283 -0.0715 0.0207 -0.1141 0.0109 -0.1156
(0.0055) (0.0229) (0.0059) (0.0280) (0.0048) (0.0425) (0.0039) (0.0648)
Heckman procedure:
 0.0147 0.0008 0.0450 0.0276 0.0260 -0.1007 0.0075 -0.1886




 0.0096 -0.0093 0.0116 -0.0375 0.0089 -0.1107 0.0045 -0.1078
(0.0054) (0.0166) (0.0058) (0.0255) (0.0049) (0.0403) (0.0034) (0.0580)
Heckman procedure:
 0.0398 0.0065 0.0392 -0.0072 0.0268 -0.1713 0.0085 -0.2362
(0.0042) (0.0142) (0.0028) (0.0206) (0.0023) (0.0330) (0.0013) (0.0493)
Alternative measures of 
Quality of the legal system, Gwartney and Lawson (2003)
Firm-time ﬁxed eﬀects:
 0.0051 -0.0274 0.0044 -0.0478 0.0014 -0.0837 0.0008 -0.0534
(0.0025) (0.0108) (0.0024) (0.0168) (0.0020) (0.0229) (0.0014) (0.0279)
Heckman procedure:
 0.0167 -0.0087 0.0135 -0.0152 0.0071 -0.0626 0.0021 -0.0901
(0.0024) (0.0077) (0.0014) (0.0102) (0.0010) (0.0150) (0.0006) (0.0225)
6 - log(cost) of enforcing a contract (as % of debt value), World Bank’s Doing Business 2011
Firm-time ﬁxed eﬀects:
 0.0227 -0.0288 0.0182 -0.0978 0.0134 -0.0774 0.0102 -0.0926
(0.0088) (0.0282) (0.0086) (0.0374) (0.0075) (0.0508) (0.0052) (0.0692)
Heckman procedure:
 0.0712 -0.0206 0.0517 -0.0784 0.0237 -0.1319 0.0082 -0.1929
(0.0071) (0.0212) (0.0041) (0.0280) (0.0028) (0.0417) (0.0014) (0.0697)
The four sets of estimations include, for the ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation, the idt (except when excluding 0
), d,
d tc o n t r o l sa n dt h e i rc h a n g e sky e a r sa f t e re n t r yl i s t e di nT a b l e5w i t ht w o - w a yc l u s t e r e d( c o u n t r yﬁrm) standard errors in
parentheses. The Heckman speciﬁcation includes the idt (except when excluding 0
), it, d, dt controls and their changes
k years after entry listed in Table 7 with country-clustered standard errors.  indicate the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient,
 p0.01,  p0.05,  p0.1.
48Table 10: Additional results on the Growth Rate of Exports
Dependent Variable Export Growth
Years After Entry≡  k = 1Y e a r k = 2Y e a r s k = 5Y e a r s k = 10 Years
Interaction between  and a dummy
indicating the presence of an aﬃliate and/or a
p a r e n tc o m p a n yi nc o u n t r yda tt i m et
Firm-time ﬁxed eﬀects:
inter -0.0239 0.4085 0.4057 0.6574
(0.1824) (0.3662) (0.4996) (0.6645)
Heckman procedure:
inter -0.0080 0.0872 0.1804 0.4523
(0.2100) (0.3019) (0.3920) (0.4448)
Interaction between  and the measure
of product complexity developed by Nunn(2007)
Firm-time ﬁxed eﬀects:
inter -0.1414 0.0207 -0.1944 -0.3870
(0.0471) (0.0583) (0.0997) (0.1652)
Heckman procedure:
inter -0.0213 0.0850 -0.1710 0.0136
(0.0352) (0.0491) (0.0770) (0.1180)
Interaction between  and ﬁrm “experience”:
number of served destinations and employment size
Firm-time ﬁxed eﬀects:
inter with _ 0.0024 0.0022 0.0028 0.0014
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0020)
inter with  0.0501 0.0611 0.0715 0.0726
(0.0094) (0.0133) (0.0185) (0.0290)
Heckman procedure:
inter with _ 0.0029 0.0024 0.0019 -0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0015)
inter with  0.0401 0.0505 0.0745 0.0617
(0.0059) (0.0082) (0.0116) (0.0201)
Interaction between  and a dummy for
wholesalers
Firm-time ﬁxed eﬀects:
inter -0.0742 -0.0781 -0.1259 -0.1551
(0.0354) (0.0438) (0.0728) (0.1087)
Heckman procedure:
inter -0.0576 -0.0254 -0.0710 -0.0769
(0.0173) (0.0258) (0.0354) (0.0564)
The ﬁve sets of estimations include, for the ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation, the idt, d,
dt controls and their changes k years after entry listed in Table 5 with two-way clustered
(country ﬁrm) standard errors in parentheses. The Heckman speciﬁcation includes the
idt, it, d, dt controls and their changes k years after entry listed in Table 7 with country-
clustered standard errors.  indicate the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient,  p0.01, 
p0.05,  p0.1.
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